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Abstract 
 
We investigate the role of physical appearance, in addition to race and sex, in the rate of 
discrimination observed in the labour market of Lima. Our experimental design allows us to 
disentangle the effect of each of those three variables on the callback rates received by our 
fictitious job candidates. Since we are controlling for variables that are important in the 
selection process (mainly, education and job experience), our results provide better indicators 
of discrimination than the ones we could obtain through the econometric analysis of 
observational data. We find that discrimination based on looks is greater than that based on 
race or sex. The first two types of discrimination are in professional and unskilled jobs. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Perhaps as early as in the childhood, we begin to form our perception of human beauty 
(Langlois and Roggman 1990). While this perception may change over the years, as a result of 
cultural factors and the influence of the media, the fact is that most people invest some of their 
time on grooming before starting their daily tasks. In the case of the United States, an average 
husband spends thirty-two minutes washing, dressing and grooming, while an average wife 
takes about forty minutes (Hamermesh 2011). While these figures are not necessarily applicable 
to other societies, it does raise the question of whether beauty pays off. 
 
In the economic sphere, the benefits beautiful persons may get are primarily related to their 
labor market returns. Again for the U.S., Hamermesh (2011) shows that attractive men 
(women) earn, on average, wages that are 17% (12%) higher than those who are unattractive, 
controlling for a variety of factors that can affect earnings (primarily, education and 
experience). These figures include a "beauty premium" (results for beautiful people, compared 
to an average-looking people) of 4% and 8%, and an "ugliness penalty" of -13% and -4%, 
respectively. 
 
In addition to the higher earnings received by attractive people in the US, compared to 
unattractive people with similar qualifications, studies from Israel and Argentina show that 
attractive people also receive more callbacks than homely-looking ones, as reported by López 
et al. (2013) and Ruffle and Shtudiner (2010). 
 
In an increasingly demanding job market, where experience and education play an important 
role, recruiters have to choose the candidates who would best fit the job requirements. If two 
job applicants had similar educational background and work experience (i.e., similar human 
capital), who should be called? In the absence of any particular preference for other attributes 
unrelated to the candidate's productivity, economic theory predicts that both should have the 
same chance of receiving a call from the recruiter.  
 
However, such an ideal result this does not always hold in reality, as reported by Galarza and 
Yamada (2012) for the case of Lima. Using an experimental methodology, the authors found 
that a white person receives almost twice as many callbacks as a Quechua person with similar 
human capital, and that male candidates are preferred to females. However, this study does not 
properly control for the level of physical appearance of the job applicants. 
 
In this paper, we investigate the role of physical appearance, in addition to race and sex, in the 
observed rate of discrimination in the labor market of Lima, Peru. In that sense, our study 
builds upon the work by Galarza and Yamada (2012), and expands the analysis by López et al. 
(2013) and Ruffle and Shtudiner (2010). Our results provide novel information about the 
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extent of discrimination that can be attributed to each of the three dimensions mentioned 
earlier. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. 
Section 3 describes our experimental methodology and the procedures we followed. Section 4 
discusses the results, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Related studies 
 
Economics defines discrimination in the labor market as a situation in which a person who 
provides a service, and is similarly productive to another person, in physical or mental, is 
treated differently and unfairly (for example, with lower earnings or lower callback rates for job 
interviews); moreover, this differential treatment is related to an observable characteristic, such 
as race, ethnicity or sex (List and Rasul 2011). 
 
There are two sets of methods to measure discrimination. The first one involves the use of 
observational data (such as national surveys) to compare the wage gaps of any two groups, so 
that the part of such a gap that cannot be explained by observables can be, at least partially, 
attributed to discrimination. The second method uses experimental economics tools for data 
collection, and is referred to as audit study. The audit studies can be of two types, but both 
involve the use of fictitious candidates. The first type consists of sending fictitious job 
applicants, with similar academic background and work experience, trained by the researcher, 
to actual interviews. A shortcoming of this type of audit study is that many things can happen 
during interviews that cannot be controlled by the candidate or the experimenter, which may 
explain the difference in the performance of two otherwise comparable candidates. The second 
type of audit study, which we used in this paper, is to send fictitious applicants' CVs with 
similar human capital. Given the equivalence in human capital, the level of discrimination is 
measured by any statistically significant difference in the average callback rates received by 
different groups of job candidates. 
 
Since the past decade, a branch of economics has attracted the interest of many economists, 
the economics of beauty, introduced by Daniel Hamermesh (Hamermesh and Biddle 1994 and 
1998, Hamermesh 2006, Hamermesh and Abrevaya 2012). As the name suggests, this nascent 
branch of economics examines the role played by the individuals' beauty in their daily 
decisions. In this regard, it is particularly useful the notion that beauty is a scarce and tradable 
attribute (Hamermesh 2011), so that there are incentives for people to invest money, time, and 
effort to enhance their beauty. Two additional features emphasized by Hamermesh (2011) are 
that: while there is no universal standard of beauty ("beauty is in the eye of the beholder"), 
societies have a similar standard of beauty; furthermore, although beauty involves more 
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characteristics than the physical appearance, the difficulty of measuring all them makes the 
physiognomy the most widely used indicator of beauty. 
 
Our paper is related to several studies, both in terms of its approach (Hamermesh 2012, 
Hamermesh and Biddle 1994, Möbius and Rosenblat 2003), and of the methodology used 
(Banerjee et al., 2009, Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004, Carlsson and Rooth 2006, Kaas and 
Manger 2010, among others). We review next some of the main related works. 
 
When examining the effects of beauty, the empirical labor literature has focused on the 
following question: Does workers' physical attractiveness plays a major role in the hiring 
decisions? As we mentioned in the Introduction, Hamermesh (2011) reports that in the US, 
homely-looking persons earn lower wages than average-looking persons, who in turn earn 
lower wages than attractive persons. Moreover, he reports that the "ugliness penalty" is bigger 
that the "beauty premium", a result that is particularly noticeable for men. 
 
On the other hand, Payet (2007), who surveyed clients of five restaurants. Payet found that 
attractive waitresses (but not waiters) received higher tips, controlling for the productivity at 
work (a control question was about the quality of the service received), this difference was 
clearly tip discriminatory conduct on the part of customers. 
 
It is interesting to add that beauty not only does can generate a significant and direct impact on 
the labor market, but also on other markets, such as marriage. In fact, Hamermesh and 
Abrevaya (2012) found a relationship between physical attractiveness and happiness, using data 
from three countries (United States, Canada and the UK): the higher salaries of beautiful 
people contribute to the happiness of the couple. 
 
As for the experimental studies on labor discrimination, the reader is referred to review 
Galarza and Yamada (2012). For our purposes, it suffices to mention that Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2004) is the most cited article in the economics literature. These authors 
analyzed racial discrimination in the United States (Chicago and Boston), by examining the 
callback rates of candidates with African American and white names. They found a 50% higher 
callback rate for whites. 
 
Moreover, to the best our knowledge, the only experimental works that examined the role of 
physical appearance in labor discrimination are Ruffle and Shtudiner (2010) and Lopez et al. 
(2013), and both used a resume audit study in the same fashion as Bertrand and Mullainathan 
(2004) did. Ruffle and Shtudiner (2010) sent CV with photo (beautiful or homely-looking) and 
without photo in Israel. They find a beauty premium for men (the average callback rate for 
attractive men was higher than that for homely-looking men and that for candidates with no 
photo attached to their CVs), but interestingly, the beauty premium is negative for women (the 
callback rate for CVs without photographs was higher than that for CVs with beautiful or 
homely-looking photos). The authors try to explain this finding by the alleged female jealousy 
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when recruiting (recruiting people, mostly women in Israel, do not want competition, they 
claim). This argument is, however, unconvincing. 
 
Lopez et al. (2013) also sent CVs in pairs (a CV with a beautiful photo and another one with a 
homely-looking photo) to analyze the effect of beauty in the labor market of Buenos Aires, 
Argentina. The results indicate that beautiful job applicants received 36% more callbacks than 
homely-looking ones. Moreover, beautiful people are called more quickly. It is important to 
remark that, unlike Ruffle and Shtudiner (2010), Lopez et al. used an objective measure of 
beauty: a ratio that measures the symmetry of the eyes and nose. The ugly photos were 
obtained by altering this symmetry (some pictures even look artificially ugly). 
 
Finally, the study by Galarza and Yamada (2012) pioneered the analysis of racial and sexual 
discrimination in the labor market of Lima, using an experimental methodology similar to that 
of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004). They sent four CV (two white candidates and two 
Quechua candidates) with the same level of human capital for every single selected job 
opening, and found that there was significant discrimination against Quechua candidates and 
to a lesser extent, against women. An important point to mention about this study is that white 
applicants had a higher score of subjective beauty (determined by a panel of judges) than 
Quechua applicants. This is an important limitation of this work. 
 
In the context described earlier, the contribution of this paper is to disentangle the effect of 
beauty from that of race in the observed labor discrimination, for both females and males. The 
analysis of this subject is particularly important in the current booming macroeconomic 
context, where one would expect that the candidates' qualifications will prevail in the hiring 
decisions, while in times of recession, we would expect the discriminatory stereotypes to 
strengthen.  
 
3. Experimental Design and Implementation 
 
3.1. Selecting the Job Vacancies 
 
The job vacancies used in the experiment were selected from one of the largest job networks 
in Lima, Aptitus, which weekly publishes online hundreds of job ads from multiple companies. 
A printed version of such vacancies is published every Sunday in the newspaper El Comercio. 
 
We used the following criteria for the selection of job offers: 
 
8 
 
i) The job experience requested should not exceed 5 years (in fact, only 18 percent of the 
selected job ads required some job experience, as shown in Annex 1). This means that we 
focus on entry-level jobs, 
ii) Vacancies should not ask for salary expectations, 
iii) Nor should they ask the candidate to deliver the CV in person, 
iv) The vacancies should not be biased towards any particular sex; we excluded job ads 
requesting only women, 
v) The email address of the contact person (employer) should show the company's domain. 
We thus made every effort to exclude employment agencies, since these are in charge of 
recruiting employees for several companies at the same time, and would make us 
vulnerable to their discovery of our fictitious candidates (at some point, we used the 
same cell number for several job candidates). A more profound reason for doing so is 
that employment agencies may not necessarily share the preferences of the employers, 
vi) Vacancies should not request to attach the photo to the CV. 
 
We thus did not restrict our sample of companies to any particular economic activity.  
 
3.2. Constructing the CVs 
 
We created a database of CVs for the three job categories we applied for (described below) 
using real existing CVs available on two large employment Web sites, 
http://www.bumeran.com.pe and http://www.computrabajo.com.pe. In the pilot stage, we 
identified the most common job vacancies for the three job categories, and constructed 
templates for those jobs. This allowed us to more quickly tailor the CVs to the specific 
requirements of the selected job ads during the field work.  
 
The format of every set of 4 CVs sent in response to each job ad was similar. In particular, the 
education levels of our candidates for each job category are as follows:  
 
(i) Professional Jobs.- Applicants for professional jobs earned the same undergraduate degree 
from the largest and arguably the most prestigious public university in Peru.2 We chose 
this university for two reasons: it offers most of the careers (unlike any other 
university, public or private) and, among the rest of large public universities, all of 
them have a strong negative perception about the quality of at least one career. 
Moreover, choosing a prestigious and large private university would certainly bias 
                                                          
2 According to a ranking of the best universities in Peru, based on the opinions of a sample of readers 
and head hunters, as well as indicators of quality and prestige, this public university ranks fourth in the 
overall ranking, and first among the public universities. This ranking was conducted by the magazine 
América Economía in 2010. 
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upwards the credentials of our job applicants, thus making harder to detect 
discrimination.  
 
(ii) Technical Jobs.- Our applicants graduated from the most prestigious technical 
institutes/colleges. While no ranking for these organizations is available, we based our 
selection on the demand that their alumnae have in the labor market in their respective 
specialties.  
 
(iii) Unskilled Jobs.- In selecting the secondary schools for all our applicants (this is the only 
education information included in the CVs for unskilled jobs), we used the list of the 
major Large School District Units (Grandes Unidades Escolares) in Lima. More 
specifically, all of our applicants obtained their secondary school diploma from public 
schools which were given the category of emblematic schools by the Ministry of 
Education, on the basis of a series of indicators signaling prestige.3 
 
As mentioned earlier, since we are aiming at entry-level jobs, our typical job applicant is in 
his/her mid twenties. They are all single, with no children. Also, each CV included a cellular 
phone number of contact (we used a set of two cell numbers per each job category). Unlike 
other studies, we found out that providing traditional wired telephones or setting up answering 
machines would not work in Peru, because employers call cell numbers and do not usually 
leave any message over the phone. Given the increasing labor supply, they would simply take 
the next CV in the pile if the previous job applicant did not answer the call.  
 
All CVs were sent electronically before the deadline (if specified in the job ad), and every set of 
four CVs for a given job ad usually shipped away the same day but at different hours, to avoid 
any effect associated with the day of receipt by employers.  
 
3.3. Selecting Surnames and Photos 
 
We used a vast database of indigenous and white surnames for our crowd of job applicants, 
both of which were gathered from a public Website4 that classifies names by their origins. The 
selected white surnames have a predominant foreign origin (Spanish, Italian, and French), 
while the indigenous (Quechuas) surnames are clearly distinctive of their origin. Sample 
surnames used include Anderson, Bresciani, Camogliano, Goicochea, Koechlin (for white 
applicants), and Aylas, Huamancuri, Sullca and Waylla (for indigenous candidates). After getting a 
long list of the two types of surnames, we got random combinations of those to come up with 
                                                          
3 These indicators include having distinguished alumni. These schools have a contribution from the 
national government for improvements in infrastructure and equipment, aimed at reducing the gap with 
the education offered by private schools. 
4 http://apellidosperuanos.wordpress.com/ 
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a database of 720 full names (first name + paternal surname + maternal surname) for each 
type of applicant (indigenous and white). We then created personal e-mail accounts.  
 
 The photos of our candidates were also collected from the Internet, and were subsequently 
modified by a Photoshop professional, in order to standardize the style (all men wear suits and 
women wear formal dress). Every candidate from a particular race was assigned a 
corresponding full name. The subjective beauty indicator was gathered from a panel of more 
than 50 judges, including students and professionals with different backgrounds who took a 
hiring decision at some point of their careers (human resource specialists, psychologists, 
anthropologists, business administrators, economists, mathematicians, and sociologists). Judges 
rated headshots using a 1-to-7 scale (from homely-looking to strikingly handsome). After 
establishing the ranking, we classified the photos as "beautiful" if their scores were between 4 
and 6, and "homely" if such scores were between 1.6 and 3. 
  
As shown in Table 1, the group of beautiful applicants is statistically more beautiful than the 
homely-looking job applicants. 
 
Table 1: Average rating of physical appearance 
 
 
Male Female 
 
White Quechua White Quechua 
Beautiful 4.68 4.92 4.78 4.79 
Homely 2.57 2.48 2.61 2.21 
 
 
Given the difficulty to get job candidates from both sexes and races with the same level of 
subjective beauty, we control for any difference in this variable in the regressions presented in 
section 4. 
 
3.4. Treatments and sample size 
 
Our sample design consists of twelve treatments that correspond to variations in terms of 
physical appearance (3), race or surname (2), and sex (2), as shown in table 2. The inclusion of 
the photographs is an innovation of our experiment (only shared with López et al. (2013) and 
Ruffle and Shtudiner (2010), and responds to our interest in looking at the extent to which 
physical appearance strengthens or weakens the level of discrimination. We selected 1,247 jobs 
ads for which we sent out 4,988 fictitious CVs, 1,576 for professional jobs, 1,692 for technical 
jobs, and 1,720 for unskilled jobs. Also, roughly in one third of the CVs we did not attach a 
photo (1,628), in one third (1,676) we attached a beautiful photo and in the remaining third 
(1,684) we attached a homely-looking photo.  
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Each set of 4 CVs sent for a given vacancy denoted a similar human capital (education and job 
experience). Two included a white surname (for female and male) and two included a Quechua 
surname. We sent every set of 4 CVs with the same level of beauty, if the case: with no photo 
attached, with a beautiful photo, and with a homely-looking photo. Thus, in the absence of 
labor discrimination, one would observe a similar average callback rate for every group of 
candidates or treatment (beautiful/homely/with no photo, white/Quechua, and 
females/males). Any statistically significant difference in callback rates (comparing groups with 
different physical appearance, race, or sex) will indicate discrimination. 
 
 
Table 2: Treatments, sample size, and callback rates 
 
 
  Quechua  White 
    Male Female Male Female 
Q
u
e
c
h
u
a
  
Beautiful 
T1  T2  
    [419] [419] 
18.14% 13.84% 
Homely 
T3  T4  
    [421] [421] 
10.69% 6.41% 
No Photo 
T5  T6  
    [407] [407]
  
12.04% 6.39% 
W
h
it
e
 
Beautiful     
T7  T8  
[419] [419] 
25.78% 22.67% 
Homely     
T9  T10  
[421] [421] 
16.86% 10.21% 
No Photo     
T11 T12  
[407] [407] 
14.00% 10.07% 
 Note: Number of observations are indicated in square brackets. 
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4. Results 
 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
In this section, we analyze the descriptive results, in terms of the callback rate received by 
different groups of our fictitious candidates. Annex 1 presents the main characteristics of the 
sample (job experience, company size, economic sector, and proportion of jobs that involve 
direct contact with the client). Annex 2 shows the main occupations CVs were sent to within 
each job category (professional, technical and unskilled).  
 
696 out of the 4,988 CVs sent had a callback, resulting in an overall response rate of 13.95%, 
which is slightly smaller than the callback rate reported in Chile (Bravo et al. 2009) [16.76%] 
and Israel (Ruffle and Shtudiner 2010) [14.50%], but higher than the rate found in the United 
States (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004) [8.05%]. 
 
Table 3 shows the overall callback rates by sex, race, and degree of beauty. As we can see, the 
greatest response rate was received by unskilled candidates (15.41%), while the lowest one was 
received by technicians (12.65%). The response rate for professional candidates was 13.77%. 
We also find a gender gap in favor of male applicants in all job categories (Panel A) and a racial 
gap in favor of white applicants for professional and unskilled jobs, but not for technical jobs 
(Panel B). 
 
Regarding the effect of physical appearance (Panel C), the response rate of the CVs sent with a 
photo (whether beautiful or homely-looking) was 15.57%, which implies that the CV without 
photo had a lower response rate (10.63%). In that sense, including the photo in the CVs seems 
to be providing useful information for the recruiters in their selection decisions. Within the set 
of CVs with photos we found a gap between the candidates deemed as homely-looking and 
those deemed as beautiful, in favor of the latter, for all job categories. 
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Table 3: Average Callback Rates by gender, race and beauty 
  
Job Category 
Nº of CVs Sent Callback Rate (%) 
A. By Sex 
Female Male Total Female Male Total 
Professional 788 788 1,576 11.55 15.99 13.77 [217] 
Technical 846 846 1,692 10.05 15.25 12.65 [214] 
Unskilled 860 860 1,720 13.26 17.56 15.41 [265] 
Total 2,494 2,494 4,988 11.63 16.28 13.95 [696] 
Job Category 
B. By Race 
Quechua White Total Quechua White Total 
Professional 788 788 1,576 8.63 18.91 13.77 [217] 
Technical 846 846 1,692 12.88 12.41 12.65 [214] 
Unskilled 860 860 1,720 12.09 18.72 15.41 [265] 
Total 2,494 2,494 4,988 11.27 16.64 13.95 [696] 
Job Category 
C. By Physical Appearance (With Photo) 
Homely Beautiful Total Homely Beautiful Total 
Professional 540 520 1,060 10.56 21.92 16.13 [171] 
Technical 568 572 1,140 9.68 16.08 12.89 [147] 
Unskilled 576 584 1,160 12.85 22.43 17.67 [205] 
Total 1,684 1,676 3,360 11.05 20.11 15.57 [523] 
Note: Number of observations in the most right column shown in square brackets. 
  
 
Let's see now if the differences observed in the above table are statistically significant. Tables 
4, 5 and 6 present evidence of the differences in the average callback rates by sex, race and 
beauty, for the three job categories, respectively. As seen in Table 4, the sex gap in the 
response rates for the Quechua candidates lies between 2.0 percentage points (professional 
jobs, although this difference is not significant) and 8.3 percentage points (technical jobs); thus 
implying that the response rates for male Quechua candidates are between 27% and 95% 
higher than those for female Quechua candidates. As for the white candidates, the most 
pronounced gap is found in professional jobs for which males receive 44% more callbacks 
than females. We also see a smaller gap against female white applicants (30%) for unskilled 
jobs exists a smaller, and no such statistically significant gap for technical jobs. 
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Table 4: Callback Rates By Sex and Job Category 
 
  Sex Ratio 
M/F 
Difference (M-F) 
Race Female n Male n 
Value 
(p.p) 
(p-
value) 
A. TOTAL 
Total 11.63 290 16.28 406 1.400 4.65 0.000*** 
Quechua 8.90 111 13.63 170 1.532 4.73 0.000*** 
White 14.35 179 18.93 236 1.318 4.57 0.002*** 
B. Professional Jobs 
Total 11.55 91 15.99 126 1.385 4.44 0.010** 
Quechua 7.61 30 9.64 38 1.267 2.03 0.310 
White 15.48 61 22.34 88 1.443 6.85 0.014** 
C. Technical Jobs 
Total 10.05 85 15.25 129 1.518 5.20 0.001*** 
Quechua 8.75 37 17.02 72 1.946 8.27 0.000*** 
White 11.35 48 13.48 57 1.188 2.13 0.348 
D. Unskilled Jobs 
Total 13.26 114 17.56 151 1.325 4.30 0.013** 
Quechua 10.23 44 13.95 60 1.364 3.72 0.094* 
White 16.28 70 21.16 91 1.300 4.88 0.066* 
*(**)[***] Statistical significance at 10 (5) [1] percent level. 
   
 
In terms of response rate by race (shown in Table 5), the overall rate for white applicants is 
48% higher than that for Quechua candidates. While we do not observe racial gaps for men 
and women who applied for technical jobs, such a gap is large for professional jobs: white 
(female + male) applicants received 120% more callbacks than Quechua applicants, while for 
the racial gap for males is 131%. Moreover, for unskilled jobs, the gap is substantially lower: 
white applicants receive 55% more callbacks than Quechua applicants. A curious result from 
our research is that for technical jobs, both Quechuas and whites received a statistically similar 
response rate, which suggests that there is no racial gap for this job category. We will later on 
discuss this and other results using regression analysis. 
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Table 5: Callback Rates By Race and Job Category 
 
  Race 
Ratio 
W/Q 
Difference (W-Q) 
Sex Quechua n White n 
Value 
(p.p) 
(p-
value) 
A. TOTAL 
Total 11.27 281 16.64 415 1.477 5.37 0.000*** 
Male  13.63 170 18.93 236 1.388 5.29 0.000*** 
Female 8.90 111 14.35 179 1.613 5.45 0.000*** 
B. Professional Jobs 
Total 8.63 68 18.91 149 2.191 10.28 0.000*** 
Male  9.64467 38 22.34 88 2.316 12.69 0.000*** 
Female 7.61421 30 15.48 61 2.033 7.87 0.000*** 
C. Technical Jobs 
Total 12.88 109 12.41 105 0.963 -0.47 0.769 
Male  17.02128 72 13.48 57 0.792 -3.55 0.151 
Female 8.74704 37 11.35 48 1.297 2.60 0.208 
D. Unskilled Jobs 
Total 12.09 104 18.72 161 1.548 6.63 0.000*** 
Male  13.95 60 21.16 91 1.517 7.21 0.005*** 
Female 10.23 44 16.28 70 1.591 6.05 0.008***  
*(**)[***] Statistical significance at 10 (5) [1] percent level. 
  
 
 
Table 6 shows that there is a "beauty gap", in the sense that the response rate for beautiful 
applicants is significantly higher than that for homely-looking applicants, and this happens in 
all three job categories analyzed. As for the magnitude of the beauty gap, this is 82% for all 
CVs sent with photographs, and this figure reaches 108% for professional jobs. A simple way 
to better understand these figures is as follows: in order to have the same success in getting a 
callback for an interview as the beautiful candidates who send 100 CVs (20 CVs receive calls), 
homely-looking candidates must send 182 CVs. This figure increases to 208 CVs in the case of 
professional jobs. 
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Table 6: Callback Rates by Physical Appearance 
 
  Physical Appearance 
Ratio 
B/H 
Difference (B-H) 
Job Category Homely n Beautiful n 
Value 
(p.p) 
(p-value) 
Total 11.05 186 20.11 337 1.820 9.06 0.000*** 
Professional 10.56 57 21.92 114 2.077 11.37 0.000*** 
Technical 9.68 55 16.08 92 1.661 6.40 0.001*** 
Unskilled 12.85 74 22.43 131 1.746 9.58 0.000*** 
 *(**)[***] Statistical significance at 10 (5) [1] percent level. 
 
 
Now let's see how much of the beauty gaps is due to what we might call "beauty premium" 
and how much is due to a "penalty for ugliness." For the former case, we compare the 
response rate for beautiful applicants with that received by candidates who did not attach 
photos to their CVs, and for the latter case, we compare the response rates for homely-looking 
applicants with those received by candidates who did not attach photos to their CVs. Using the 
figures reported in Table 7, we find that there is a beauty premium (beautiful candidates 
receive a response rate that is 89% higher than that received by candidates who did not attach 
photos to their CV), which is particularly marked for females (such rate reaches 122%) and 
whites (100%), while the beauty premium for males and Quechuas reached 69% and 73%, 
respectively. Furthermore, we do not observe a penalty for ugliness. 
 
Table 7 also allows us to identify sex gaps within each group of candidates who whether 
attached photos (beautiful or homely-looking) to their CVs or not. Interestingly, we find that 
these gaps are much larger among those who did not attach photos to their CVs (between 39% 
for whites, and 88% for Quechuas) than among those who did attach photos (between 30% 
for whites, and 42% for Quechuas). And those gaps are mainly explained by those observed 
for homely-looking candidates (about 65% for both races). Furthermore, we observe greater 
sex gaps for Quechuas than for whites, except for homely-looking candidates, as we saw 
earlier. 
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Table 7: Callback Rates By Sex and Physical Appearance 
 
  Sex 
Ratio 
M/F 
Difference (M-F) 
Race Female n Male n 
Value 
(p.p) 
(p-
value) 
A. TOTAL 
Total 11.63 290 16.28 406 1.400 4.65 0.000*** 
Quechua 8.90 111 13.63 170 1.532 4.73 0.000*** 
White 14.35 179 18.93 236 1.318 4.57 0.002*** 
B. WITH PHOTO 
Total 13.27 223 17.86 300 1.35 4.58 0.000***  
Quechua 10.12 85 14.40 121 1.42 4.29 0.007***  
White 16.43 138 21.31 179 1.30 4.88 0.010** 
B1. Beautiful 
Total 18.26 153 21.96 184 1.20 3.70 0.059*  
Quechua 13.84 58 18.14 76 1.31 4.30 0.090*  
White 22.67 95 25.78 108 1.14 3.10 0.294 
B.2. Homely 
Total 8.31 70 13.78 116 1.66 5.46 0.000***  
Quechua 6.41 27 10.69 45 1.67 4.28 0.027**  
White 10.21 43 16.86 71 1.65 6.65 0.005*** 
C. NO PHOTO 
Total 8.23 67 13.02 106 1.58 4.79 0.002*** 
Quechua 6.39 26 12.04 49 1.88 5.65 0.005*** 
White 10.07 41 14.00 57 1.39 3.93 0.085*  
*(**)[***] Statistical significance at 10 (5) [1] percent level. 
  
 
 
Table 8 shows the racial gaps by level of physical appearance and whether the candidates 
attached a photo to the CVs or not. Similarly to the sex gap seen in Table 7, the racial gap is 
uniform for homely-looking candidates (about 60%, in favor of the whites). The callback rates 
for male candidates from both races with no photo attached to their CVs are not statistically 
different, in contrast to what happens for females (the racial gap is almost 60% in this case). In 
general, the racial gaps are similar in magnitude regardless of their physical appearance, 
especially for females. 
 
  
18 
 
Table 8: Callback Rates By Race and Physical Appearance 
 
  Race 
Ratio 
W/Q 
Difference (W-Q) 
Sex Quechua n White n 
Value 
(p.p) 
(p-
value) 
A. TOTAL 
Total 11.27 281 16.64 415 1.477 5.37 0.000*** 
Male  13.63 170 18.93 236 1.388 5.29 0.000*** 
Female 8.90 111 14.35 179 1.613 5.45 0.000*** 
B. WITH PHOTO 
Total 12.26 206 18.87 317 1.54 6.61 0.000***  
Male  14.40 121 21.31 179 1.48 6.90 0.000***  
Female 10.12 85 16.43 138 1.62 6.31 0.000***  
B1. Beautiful 
Total 15.99 134 24.22 203 1.51 8.23 0.000*** 
Male  18.14 76 25.78 108 1.42 7.64 0.008*** 
Female 13.84 58 22.67 95 1.64 8.83 0.001*** 
B.2. Homely 
Total 8.55 72 13.54 114 1.58 4.99 0.001*** 
Male  10.69 45 16.86 71 1.58 6.18 0.009*** 
Female 6.41 27 10.21 43 1.59 3.80 0.046**  
C. NO PHOTO 
Total 9.21 75 12.04 98 1.31 2.83 0.064* 
Male  12.04 49 14.00 57 1.16 1.97 0.405 
Female 6.39 26 10.07 41 1.58 3.69 0.056* 
*(**)[***] Statistical significance at 10 (5) [1] percent level. 
 
  
 
Let us examine now if these results remain in an econometric regression context, in which we 
will control for the heterogeneity that may exist among the companies the CVs were sent to. 
 
4.2. Econometric Results 
 
The general equation to estimate using OLS is as follows: 
  
                                                                
                , 
 
where we want to explain the callback rate, variable that takes the value of 1 if the candidate "i" 
has received a callback from the employer for an interview, and the value of 0, if no response 
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has been received. The right-hand-side variables are also binary ones (and take the value of 1 if 
the candidate has the respective characteristic, and 0, otherwise), except for the Beauty level, 
which is a continuous variable that reports the level of subjective physical appearance 
corresponding to candidate "i", provided that he/she is deemed as beautiful, and takes the 
value of zero if candidate "i" is not beautiful. Thus,    gives the incremental benefit from 
being beautiful in terms of receiving a callback. Given the difficulty of its interpretation, we 
will only look at the statistical significance, and sign of this coefficient. This coefficient is 
reported in the fourth row of the following four tables. 
 
The other coefficients of interest,   ,   ,   ,   , measure the extent of discrimination due to 
sex, race, beauty, and to the sole fact of including a photo in the CV, respectively. A coefficient 
with a positive sign that is statistically significant would provide evidence of discrimination in 
favor of the related characteristic (being male, white, beautiful, or having attached a photo to 
their CVs). 
 
Tables 9, 10, 11, and 12 report the main regression results.5 In all the cases, we will look at the 
results from columns III, IV and V, as they include the three variables of interest (sex, race and 
beauty). In all regressions, the main results remain unaltered when we control for the 
companies' economic sector. 
 
Table 9 shows the results for the entire sample of observations. As indicated in column III, 
white candidates have a larger response rate (by 6.6 percentage points) than Quechua 
candidates. This difference implies that white candidates receive 55% more callbacks than 
similarly qualified Quechua candidates. Males also receive more callbacks than females (by 4.6 
percentage points), which means that the former receive 34% more callbacks than the latter. 
On the other hand, if the candidate is a beautiful person, the response rate increases by 9.1 
percentage points, that is, a beautiful job applicant receives a callback rate that is 83% bigger 
that that received by a homely-looking applicant (column III). Moreover, for each additional 
point on the level of beauty that a beautiful candidate has (variable "beauty level"), the 
probability of being called back for an interview increases by 1.8 percentage points (column 
IV). On the other hand, attaching a photo to the CV increases the likelihood of being called 
back by 4.9 percentage points (or in 47% ) (column V). 
  
                                                          
5 Results are similar when we run probabilistic models (e.g., probit) instead of a linear probability 
model. 
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Table 9: OLS Results on the Callback Dummy: Entire Sample 
 
Variable I II III IV V 
Male 0.0465*** 0.0465*** 0.0458*** 0.0457*** 0.0465*** 
  (0.0098) (0.0976) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0974) 
White 
 
0.0537*** 0.0661*** 0.0673*** 0.0537*** 
 
(0.0976) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0974) 
Beautiful 
  
0.0906*** 
  
  
(0.0123) 
  
Beauty level 
(dummy*ranking)    
0.0182*** 
 
   
(0.0025) 
 
With Photo 
    
0.0494*** 
    
(0.0098) 
Constant 0.1162*** 0.0894*** 0.0545*** 0.05555*** 0.0561*** 
(0.0639) (0.0751) (0.0148) (0.1049) (0.0096) 
Average Callback Rate 0.1395 0.1395 0.1395 0.1395 0.1395 
N 4988 4988 3360 3360 4988 
R-Squared 0.0045 0.0105 0.0279 0.0273 0.015 
Note: Robust Standard Errors in parentheses. 
  
*(**)[***] Statistical significance at 10 (5) [1] percent level. 
  
 
 
Tables 10, 11 and 12 display the results for each job category examined: professional, technical, 
and unskilled, respectively. As shown in Table 10, column III, for professional jobs, race and 
beauty are the two most important factors correlated with discrimination. In particular, while 
being male increases the likelihood of being called back for an interview by 5.8 percentage 
points, being white increase it by 10.8 percentage points, and being a beautiful candidate 
increase it by 11.4 percentage points. These percentages imply gaps of 44% (sexual), 99% 
(racial), and 108% (by physical appearance), respectively, which show that a white (Quechua) 
professional job applicant who is beautiful (homely-looking) has enormous payoff (penalty), in 
terms of calls for interviews, in the Lima labor market. Companies also prefer the candidates to 
attach a photo to their CVs: a candidate who does so has a higher probability, by 7.2 
percentage points (a 81% higher chance), of being called back compared to another one who 
does not attach a photo to his/her CV (column V). 
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Table 10: OLS Results on the Callback Dummy: Professional Jobs 
 
Variable I II III IV V 
Male 0.0444** 0.0444** 0.0585*** 0.0577*** 0.0444*** 
  (0.0173) (0.0171) (0.0220) (0.0221) (0.0171) 
White   0.1028*** 0.1075*** 0.1093*** 0.1028*** 
  (0.0171) (0.0220) (0.0221) (0.0171) 
Beautiful     0.1137***     
    (0.0221)     
Beauty level 
(dummy*ranking) 
      0.0230***   
      (0.0045)   
With Photo         0.0722*** 
        (0.0166) 
Constant 0.1155*** 0.0641*** 0.0225 0.0236 0.0155*** 
(0.0114) (0.0127) (0.0183) (0.0184) (0.0158) 
Average Callback Rate 0.1377 0.1377 0.1377 0.1377 0.1377 
N 1576 1576 1060 1060 1576 
R-Squared 0.0047 0.0264 0.0516 0.0510 0.0361 
Note: Robust Standard Errors in parentheses. 
   *(**)[***] Statistical significance at 10 (5) [1] percent level. 
   
 
Moreover, for technical jobs (Table 11), the sexual and beauty gaps are smaller, in absolute 
value, than those observed for professional jobs. We also see that there is no racial gap, and 
that the beauty gap is still higher than the gender gap (66% versus 41%, as seen in column III). 
Even if we include only those jobs where there is a direct contact with the public (mainly, 
sales), race continues to have no effect on the response rate in these types of jobs. We did not 
observe any "photo effect" in this case, either. 
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Table 11: OLS Results on the Callback Dummy: Technical Jobs 
 
Variable I II III IV V 
Male 0.0520*** 0.0520*** 0.0439*** 0.0436*** 0.0520*** 
  (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0198) (0.0197) (0.0161) 
White   -0.0047 0.0052 0.0062 -0.0047 
  (0.0161) (0.0198) (0.0198) (0.0161) 
Beautiful     0.0640***     
    (0.0197)     
Beauty level 
(dummy*ranking) 
      0.0135***   
      (0.0041)   
With Photo         0.0076 
        (0.0170) 
Constant 0.1004*** 0.1028*** 0.0723*** 0.0717*** 0.0977*** 
(0.0103) (0.1264) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0169) 
Average Callback Rate 0.1265 0.1265 0.1265 0.1265 0.1265 
N 1692 1692 1140 1140 1692 
R-Squared 0.0061 0.0062 0.0135 0.0138 0.0063 
Note: Robust Standard Errors in parentheses. 
  *(**)[***] Statistical significance at 10 (5) [1] percent level. 
    
 
Finally, for the case of unskilled jobs, we find that the role of sex is marginal, while beauty and 
race are still the main sources of discrimination, with gaps of 75% and 66%, respectively (Table 
12, column III). In turn, including a picture to the CVs increases the probability of being called 
in 65% (7 percentage points, as shown in column V). Why would an employer prefer to hire a 
beautiful female candidate instead of a homely-looking, but equally qualified candidate? One 
possible reason may be that this employer's customers will be more interested in demanding 
his services or buying his products if they are delivered by an attractive employee. If this were 
the case, the effect of beauty on callback rates should be higher in jobs where there is a direct 
contact with the public, which is not the case in our data. Another possibility is that the 
employer has a special taste for working with beautiful employees, in which case we would be 
observing a preference-based discrimination (Becker, 1957). 
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Table 12: OLS Results on the Callback Dummy: Unskilled Jobs 
 
Variable I II III IV V 
Male 0.0430*** 0.0430*** 0.0362Δ 0.0367* 0.0430** 
  (0.0174) (0.0173) (0.0221) (0.0221) (0.0172) 
White   0.0663*** 0.0879*** 0.0890*** 0.0663*** 
    (0.0173) (0.0221) (0.0221) (0.0172) 
Beautiful     0.0958***     
    (0.0221)     
Beauty level (dummy*ranking)        0.0184***   
      (0.0045)   
With Photo         0.0696*** 
        (0.0172) 
Constant 0.1325*** 0.0994*** 0.0664*** 0.0694*** 0.0525*** 
  (0.0115) (0.1349) (0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0168) 
Average Callback Rate 0.1541 0.1541 0.1541 0.1541 0.1541 
N 1720 1720 1160 1160 1720 
R-Squared 0.0036 0.0120 0.0313 0.0295 0.0201 
Note: Robust Standard Errors in parentheses. 
    *(**)[***] Statistical significance at 10 (5) [1] percent level. 
 
      p-value = 0.101. 
 
 
An interesting result drawn from the three previous tables in regards to the magnitude of the 
racial gap according to the educational level of the candidates (secondary for unskilled jobs, 
technical for technical jobs, and university for professional jobs) is that there is a U-shape 
relationship between the magnitude of the racial gap and the educational level, where the 
smallest racial gap occurs in technical jobs and higher ones are observed at the two ends of the 
educational levels considered (secondary and university). This is a result that deserves further 
exploration in future studies. 
 
The size of the company, the customer contact and service companies 
 
In order to make a richer analysis of the information collected, we examine below the 
econometric results splitting the sample by company size (we use the job ad size as a proxy), by 
whether jobs involve a direct contact with the, and by some specific economic sector of 
activity. Table 13 reports these results. Firstly, with respect to firm size (columns I and II), we 
found that, while large and medium companies strongly prefer males and, secondly, whites, for 
small and micro enterprises beauty seems to be the most important factor, followed by race 
and sex. We should remark that we are only using a proxy variable for the firm size, but it is 
nevertheless interesting to find that in smaller firms physical appearance plays a greater role 
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than in large companies when it comes to overcoming the first hurdle in the employment 
selection process. 
 
Secondly (see columns III and IV), and to our surprise, we found that for jobs that does not 
involve contact with the customer, beauty is the most important variable, followed by sex and 
race. In contrast with this result, for jobs involving contact with the customers, there is no 
preference for male or female candidates, while race and beauty are similarly important. 
Furthermore, race for jobs involving contact with the customers is similarly important than 
beauty for office jobs. 
 
Table 13: Size of the company, customer contact, and trade and services 
 
 
Company Size 
Contact with 
Customer? Sectors 
Variable 
Large / 
Medium 
Small / 
Micro Yes No 
Commerce, 
consultancies  
   (I) (II)  (III)  (IV)  
/ services 
(V) 
Male 0.1000*** 0.0404***         0.0536*** 0.0385* 
  (0.0371) (0.0131) (0.0209) (0.0152) (0.0197) 
White 0.0905** 0.0623*** 0.0953*** 0.0499*** 0.0799*** 
  (0.0371) (0.0131) (0.0209) (0.0152) (0.0197) 
Beautiful  0.0775** 0.0952***   0.0857*** 0.0931***   0.1223*** 
(0.0371)  (0.0131)  (0.0208)   (0.0153)  (0.0197) 
Constant       
  0.0520*** 0.0537*** 0.0551*** 0.0420*** 
  (0.0322) (0.0109) (0.0182) (0.0128) (0.0161) 
Average Callback Rate 0.1379 0.1390 0.1453 0.1362 0.1471 
N 420 2920 1196 2164 1352 
R-Squared 0.0404 0.0284 0.0322 0.0271 0.0419 
Note: Robust Standard Errors in parentheses. 
  *(**)[***] Statistical significance at 10 (5) [1] percent level. 
    p-value= 0.125. 
  p-value = 0.131. 
 
Thirdly, given that 40% of the companies we sent the CVs to (see Annex 1) belong to the 
sectors of retail and wholesale, consultancy, and manufacture, we examined the regression 
results for these sectors. As shown in column V of table 13, beauty is the most significantly 
correlated variable with the callback rates. Its importance is similar in magnitude to that of the 
combined effect of being male and white. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
This paper has shown statistical evidence about the existence -and magnitude- of 
discrimination based on physical appearance, race, and sex (which we call gaps) in the labor 
market of Lima. Figure 1 summarizes the main findings regarding the magnitude of those gaps, 
shown in each of the three axes. In reading the graph, if the resulting shape is an equilateral 
triangle, this would mean that there are equal-sized gaps. Also, smaller triangles indicate smaller 
gaps in magnitude. 
 
Figure 1: Impact of beauty, race and sex on the callback rate 
 
 
 
 
As we can see, then, for the entire sample (blue solid line), the beauty gap more than doubles 
the sexual gap, and is 1.5 times the racial gap. This result is in turn mainly explained by the 
discrimination observed in professional jobs (green, dashed line) and unskilled jobs (purple, 
dashed line with a star), which show larger triangles, and exhibit higher discrimination rates by 
beauty and race. 
 
Our results provide quite unprecedented indicators on labor market discrimination in Peru. 
Although we are only examining the first stage of the selection process, we believe that the 
Beautiful
MaleWhite
Total Unskilled
Technical Professional
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results are extremely important for labor market analysis Lima, because we suspect that in the 
second phase of the selection (the interviews) there is an even bigger room for discrimination. 
 
While all forms of discrimination are reprehensible, the magnitude of that based on looks it 
strikingly large in professional and unskilled jobs. As discussed herein, this discrimination 
based on looks happens not only in jobs where there is a direct contact with the customer, but 
also in office jobs.  
 
We hope that the results of this study will contribute to discuss this complex subject, and to 
design solutions to mitigate the problem.  
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Annexes 
 
Annex 1: Summary Indicators 
 
Job Applicants 
Characteristics 
Race 
White 2494 50.00% 
Quechua 2494 50.00% 
Sex 
Male 2494 50.00% 
Female 2494 50.00% 
Treatment 
No Photo 1628 32.64% 
Homely 1684 33.76% 
Beautiful 1676 33.60% 
Jobs 
Characteristics 
Job 
Category 
Professional 1576 31.60% 
Technical 1692 33.92% 
Unskilled 1720 34.48% 
Job 
Experience 
None 4084 81.88% 
Up to 1 year 428 8.58% 
Between 1 & 2 years 436 8.74% 
3 or more years 40 0.80% 
Public / 
Office 
Contact with the Public 3164 63.43% 
Office 1824 36.57% 
Company's 
Characteristics 
Size of 
Company * 
1: Micro 3037 60.89% 
2 1035 20.75% 
3: Medium 496 9.94% 
4 224 4.49% 
5: Large 172 3.45% 
Economic 
Sector 
Wholesale and retail 804 16.12% 
Consultancy (professional, 
technical or scientific) 628 12.59% 
Manufacturing 572 11.47% 
Others 2984 59.82% 
* Based on size of job ads. 24 Job ads were gathered from Aptitus online. 
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Annex 2: Main Occupations by Job Category 
 
Professional 
Business Administration 216 13.71% 
Arquitecture 48 3.05% 
Accountancy 524 33.25% 
Economics and Finance 48 3.05% 
Civil Engineering 224 14.21% 
Industrial Engineering 128 8.12% 
Mechanic Engineering 60 3.81% 
Sales and Marketing 144 9.14% 
Others  184 11.68% 
Total 1576 100.00% 
Technical 
Assistant in Business Administration 144 8.51% 
Assistant in Accountancy 412 24.35% 
Asisstant in Logistics 56 3.31% 
Graphic Design 84 4.96% 
Mechanic 84 4.96% 
Technician in Computers 148 8.75% 
Technician in Electricity 124 7.33% 
Technician in Electronics 124 7.33% 
Technician in Pharmaceuticals 40 2.36% 
Technician in Mechanics 36 2.13% 
Sales and Marketing 280 16.55% 
Others 160 9.46% 
Total 1692 100.00% 
Unskilled 
Services Helper 76 4.42% 
Warehouse Helper 72 4.09% 
Cook Helper 76 4.42% 
Call Center / Customer Service 140 8.14% 
Driver 276 16.05% 
Waiter/Waitress 88 5.12% 
Security 48 2.79% 
Sales and Marketing 700 40.70% 
Others 244 14.19% 
Total 1720 100.00% 
 
